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1. Introduction 
 Today major civilian casualties and gross human rights violations are not the 
result of interstate wars, but of what traditionally has been seen as intrastate conflicts. In 
principle, because of being internal, these conflicts have been considered outside of the 
valid course of action of the international community. The United Nations Charter is 
clear. "[A] sovereign state is empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and 
total jurisdiction within its territorial borders, and the other states have the corresponding 
duty not to intervene in its internal affairs."1 
  Yet, haven't states also agreed on setting global standards of behavior concerning 
human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the Geneva Conventions, that 
should specifically address these situations? 
 Commenting on this legal imbalance, Diehl et al. tell us that although one might 
think that international law functions resembling Hart's classification of primary norms 
and secondary rules, in which secondary rules serve to solve problems such as 
inefficiency or uncertainty of primary norms, the conceptualization and functioning of the 
international legal system is somehow different.  
 As the authors explain, it is easier to understand international law "as a dual 
system for regulating interactions both generally and within specific areas,"2 or a system 
that provides for both an operating and a normative system in ordering international 
relations. As a normative system, international law guides international behavior by 
identifying specific goals and values to be promoted and protected. As an operating 
                                                 
1
 Evans et al. 2002, p. 102. 
2
 Diehl et al. 2009, p. 1. 
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system, international law provides a supportive structure through which new norms and 
rules are created, parameters for interaction established, and procedures and institutions 
to solve potential conflicts determined. 
  In order to comprehend how international law functions, it is basic to keep in 
mind that while through the years the tendency has been towards expansion in both of its 
dimensions,3 4  it is precisely because of its Westphalian legacy - in which international 
law is basically conceived as regulating interactions among, but not above, or within 
states - that the operating system is not only more elaborated than the normative system, 
but also, that some of its elements limit the progress of elements of its normative 
counterpart.  
 Accordingly, the existence of imbalances between normative developments, and 
the capacity of the international legal system to support the implementation of norms, are 
not uncommon. The problem presents itself not only when new norms are created, but 
lack "the appropriate processes and structures... to give [them full] effect",5 but also when 
effective implementation appears to be 'incompatible' with previous norms or institutions 
- a persistent setback. 
  As explained by Diehl et al., while existing imbalances can remain unresolved, 
political shocks6 may facilitate operating system changes. However, in the absence of 
international consensus, or when necessary operational changes run counter to the 
                                                 
3
 In its operating dimension by increasing "the number of actors[,] forms of decision-making[, as well as] 
forums and modes of implementation."  
Ibid, p. 6. 
4
 In its normative dimension by increasing its depth and scope, especially in issue specific areas such as 
human rights, where international law regulates behavior within states. 
5
 Diehl et al. 2009, p. 164. 
6
 According to Diehl et al. "political shocks can be discrete events, such as world wars, acts of terrorism, or 
horrific human rights abuses [that] represent dramatic changes in the international political environment." 
Diehl et al. 2003, p.57. 
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interests of powerful states, political shocks can also give rise to extra-systemic 
adaptation processes, such as soft law mechanisms.  
 Defined as "those that do not involve a formal legal obligation or legal processes, 
but nevertheless represent a shared understanding or consensus about procedure or 
behavior among the parties",7 soft law mechanisms are usually created to "provide for 
both norms and their implementation when formal agreements are not possible or involve 
issues that are heretofore considered domestic concerns."8 9 
 As pointed by Abbot et al., one of the main advantages of softer types of 
legislation is to provide states with the opportunity to learn about emerging international 
challenges and possible avenues for cooperation, thereby providing the international 
community with a mechanism that can help to develop further consensus and 
compromise among states. In this view, although soft law adaptations "do not ensure a 
fully functioning legal system,10 they are in some cases superior to operating system 
components designed to fulfill the same functions."11   
 As we will see through this thesis, emergence of the Responsibility to Protect 
constituted a direct reaction to mass atrocities and evidence of the dynamic nature of the 
international legal system, which, through the ongoing process of evolution of the human 
rights regime, directly centers individuals and their inalienable rights as the main subjects 
for protection at the national and international levels.  
 As a soft law mechanism based on strong normative foundations, and the 
                                                 
7
 Diehl et al. 2009, p. 177. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Elaborating on this point Abbott et al. tell us that it is precisely because of the high sovereignty costs of 
formal arrangements as well as the uncertain consequences that can derive from their application, that 
states choose to cooperate through these types of legislation. 
10
 Since there may be some operating system gaps that are not address in their totality. 
11
 Diehl et al. 2009, p. 9. 
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adaptation or re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as Responsibility, the Responsibility to 
Protect provides a comprehensible response to a substantive question: how to reconcile 
the institution of state sovereignty,12 fundamental for orderly relations among nations,  
with agreed upon standards of behavior and humanitarian precepts, such as the 
prohibition of genocide, which have reached the status of jus cogens norms.13   
 In this view, the Responsibility to Protect - or the primary responsibility of states 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity, and the complementary responsibility of the international community 
to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility, and to react by diplomatic and other 
peaceful means, and only if necessary, through the use of force in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter - represents not an idealistic solution, but a serious effort to 
construct a coherent and realistic framework to better coordinate international institutions 
and norms that initially appear as irreconcilable.   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 And its related principles such as non-interference. 
13
 Citing the International Court of Justice 1986 Nicaragua decision, Shelton tells us that ius cogens norms 
are those "rules of international humanitarian law so fundamental to respect for the human person and 
'elementary considerations of humanity' that 'they constitute intransgressible principles of international 
customary law'." 
Shelton 2009, p. 86.  
 8 
2. Research Design  
2. 1 Hypothesis 
 Motivated by the divided positions that followed from the Security Council's 
adoption of Resolution 1973,14 and its implementation by NATO, as well as by the 
expanding debate on the role and utility of the Responsibility to Protect when considering 
the international community's differing treatment of events currently unfolding in 
countries like Syria and in Bahrain, the object of this thesis is to better understand what is 
the Responsibility to Protect, what is the relationship between the developing framework 
and greater compliance with international law, and what are its main contributions, 
pending challenges and limitations. 
 I will argue that although the Responsibility to Protect has commonly been 
defined as a norm or an emerging norm, such an understanding can lead to inaccurate 
interpretations of what should be expected from the developing framework. Instead, I will 
argue that it is better to understand the Responsibility to Protect as a soft law mechanism 
aimed at facilitating compliance with previously agreed-to standards of behavior. As I 
will seek to demonstrate, this interpretation is not only more realistic, when considering 
that due to the high sovereignty costs involved in the framework15 it is probable that the 
Responsibility to Protect will never reach full legalization, but is also more coherent, 
when realizing that the most important contribution of the framework is not really legal 
but political.  
 
                                                 
14
 Concerning the situation of Libya. 
15
 Both of decision-making sovereignty in the case of powerful states and of territorial sovereignty in the 
case of weaker ones 
See Luck 2010, p. 362. 
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2. 2 Methodology 
 This thesis will adopt a qualitative approach to analysis based on the use of case 
studies, and the review of relevant literature, official documents such as United Nations 
General Assembly declarations, Security Council resolutions and Secretary General 
reports, as well as statements by member states representatives and UN officials.  
 Following Diehl et al.'s conceptualization of soft law mechanisms, the first part of 
this thesis will revisit the political shocks that led to the emergence of the Responsibility 
to Protect. After reviewing the international response to humanitarian crises in Somalia, 
Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo during the nineteen nineties, I will explore the theoretical 
foundations of the Responsibility to Protect: the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as 
Responsibility, developed by Francis Deng during the mid-nineties, and the 
Responsibility to Protect as conceived and presented to the world in 2001 by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.  
 Next, I will review the political efforts aimed at creating and advancing 
international consensus on the framework, the negotiation process undertaken by states 
within the United Nations system, and the language in which the Responsibility to Protect 
was publicly acclaimed by world leaders at the World Summit in 2005. Over this basis I 
will explore the steps that have been taken at the United Nations in order to implement 
the Responsibility to Protect as an organizing framework for political action at the 
international, regional and national levels. My thesis will conclude by identifying the 
main contributions, pending challenges and the limitations of the Responsibility to 
Protect.  
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3. Political Shocks 
 Understanding the circumstances that led to the emergence of the Responsibility 
to Protect  takes us back to the early nineties, a time that seemed like a historic moment 
for the United Nations. The end of the Cold War allowed the organization to immerse 
itself in vast regions of the world through diplomacy, mediation, and peace operations. In 
addition, in 1991, the United Nations had coordinated an exemplary response to Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait. 
  Yet, despite talk of a 'new world order', images of peacekeepers as 'freedom 
warriors', and the declaration by members of the Security Council in 1992 that social, 
economic and even ecological crises could constitute threats falling within their 
purview,16 events to happen in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia would soon 
shake the organization.  
 As explained by Traub, in the excitement of the moment it had been easy to 
overlook crucial facts. First, the dynamics and challenges of conflict prone areas were 
changing dramatically in the context of the post-Cold War era. Second, the United 
Nations "had no previous experience with the boiling madness of civil war."17 Third, 
"Council members had made no serious effort to match the size and capacity"18 of 
authorized operations to the environment in which peacekeepers were going to be 
deployed. Fourth, "the United States had attained such global dominance with the 
collapse of the Soviet empire that it could afford to act on its own, even if it preferred not 
to."19 
                                                 
16
 Chesterman 2002, p. 300. 
17
 Traub 2006, p. 60. 
18
 Ibid. p. 36. 
19
 Ibid, p. 25. 
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3. 1 Somalia 1993   
 The United Nations presence in Somalia in 1992 constituted a direct application 
of the Security Council's new approach to global security. In practice, although 
intolerable in humanitarian terms, the Somali crisis did not present any type of threat to 
international peace and security per se, but a threat to Somalis themselves. In addition, 
UNOSOMs20 initial contingent numbered five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers, who as 
pointed out by Traub, were being deployed in the middle of a 'madhouse' run by 
contending factions.     
  After the totality of UNOSOMs personnel were held down at Mogadishu's airport 
by forces loyal to the chief warlord Mohammed Aideed, former Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali asked the United States government for needed support in order to 
carry out the operation. Amazingly, "[h]aving already lost his re-election bid"21 President 
George H. Bush authorized the unthinkable, and "[a]n astonishing thirty-seven thousand 
troops, twenty-eight thousand of them American, [took] over the job from the five 
hundred Pakistanis."22 
 Yet, even with this reinforcement, UNOSOMs mission would prove 
unsustainable. The operation had been conceived as a patchy response to the Somali 
crisis, and its mandate only encompassed the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians 
by keeping contending factions at bay. With no American national interests involved, and 
the mission's goals seemingly accomplished, the Clinton administration was eager to pull 
out American troops. Re-considering these issues, the Security Council authorized a new 
operation in March, 1993.  
                                                 
20
 United Nations Operation in Somalia. 
21
 Traub 2006, p. 37. 
22
 Ibid. 
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 Ironic, when thinking that the contingent that was going to replace American 
troops was worse trained and armed that its predecessor, the mission's mandate was 
broadened. This time the operation's goals aimed not only at ensuring the flow of 
humanitarian aid to civilians, but also at disarming contending factions, and at starting to 
rebuild the Somali State. 
 Not surprisingly, in June 1993, once ten thousand US Marines had left, "Aideed's 
troops ambushed two Pakistani units, killing twenty-six" peacekeepers.23 The next day, 
responding to what seemed like an attack on the United Nations, the Security Council 
authorized "all necessary precautions against all those responsible for armed attacks".24 
The consequences of this authorization would prove disastrous.  
 Acting outside of the mission's mandate, eighteen US Army Rangers died while 
trying to capture Aideed's closest men. This signified high costs for the Clinton 
administration since the operation had been orchestrated by the United States Special 
Operations Command in Florida, not the United Nations. For Somalis, the operation 
meant the deaths of thousands of civilians, thus ending all support from the local 
population. For the United Nations, "Somalia was a profound shock to the system:"25 the 
whole Mogadishu experience had demonstrated that the organization was both 
unprepared, and unable to operate in a coherent way in the context of a failed state.  
 
3. 2 Rwanda 1994 
 The United Nations presence in Rwanda started as a part of a wider effort in the 
Central African region aimed at persuading rival groups to lay down arms, and to manage 
                                                 
23
 Ibid, p. 38. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid, p. 39. 
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internal conflict by accepting "systems of power sharing."26  
 By August, 1993, the Arusha Accords had been signed by President 
Habyarimana, representing the Hutu government, and by the RPF,27 a Tutsi rebel group 
that had accumulated considerable military gains in the northern part of the country since 
the beginning of the Rwandan Civil War in 1990. The parties had agreed to start working 
on their differences, and to a ceasefire line to be monitored by the United Nations. 
  Yet unfortunate dynamics were already developing. First, Security Council 
members again were underestimating the size of the contingent that was required to 
accomplish the mission's goals. Although the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping had initially estimated that UNAMIR28 would require the presence of 
twelve hundred men, pressed by the increasing costs of peace operations, the Security 
Council authorized the deployment of a force of only eight hundred. Second and more 
importantly, the real risk in Rwanda, the Interahamwe, a militia group composed mainly 
of Hutu radicals who felt President Habyarimana was compromising too much just by 
negotiating with Tutsis, had not been a party to the peace agreement, and because of that, 
they were considered out of the mandate or scope of action of UNAMIR. Third, because 
of Somalia, the institution and its members, specially the United States, were in denial.  
 Neither detailed information coming from UNAMIR's Commander, Romeo 
Dallaire, in January 1994 on the emerging dynamics on the ground and on the atrocities 
that were about to happen, nor that the extermination of Tutsis and of moderate Hutus 
since the beginning of April was becoming systematic, was able to modify the 
organization's passive approach to the conflict or its humanitarian consequences. Instead, 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, p. 51. 
27
 Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
28
 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. 
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the Peacekeeping Department 'explained' to Dallaire that the overriding consideration of 
peacekeeping missions was to avoid the use of force. He was explicitly reminded that the 
scope of UNAMIR's mandate did not contemplate actions such as seizing illegal arms 
from the Interahamwe, or providing protection to civilians! 
 On April 6th, facilitated by the lack of any type of coherent action by the United 
Nations, and after a missile had blown up President Habyarimana's plane, "the killing 
began within hours."29 In a desperate effort on April 7th, Dallaire contacted the 
Peacekeeping Department with a last minute plan to persuade moderate Hutus to organize 
against the Interahamwe. Sadly, he was again told that it was imperative, in light of the 
disaster that had just occurred in Somalia, that UNAMIR did not take sides. 
  From that point on, events in Rwanda followed exactly the path that had been 
delineated a couple of months earlier in Dallaire's cable to the Secretariat. On April 10th, 
a group of ten Belgian peacekeepers was killed by the Interahamwe. Reacting to the 
episode, Belgians and Americans began advocating for withdrawal of the operation. With 
the situation rapidly deteriorating Boutros Boutros Ghali implored Council members to 
stop the violence by authorizing the use of force on April 19th. Yet facilitated by a lack 
of international consensus on how to proceed, and if to proceed,30 the Secretary General's 
plea was highly questioned. 
 Even by the last days of April, when estimates of victims were close to five 
hundred thousand, "and the newspapers and airwaves were filled with accounts of 
                                                 
29
 Traub 2006, p. 55. 
30
 As Traub tells us, member states seemed to be divided into several groups. The first was formed by many 
developing countries that had been persuaded by the Rwandan representative to the UN that the RPF was to 
be blamed for increasing levels of violence in his country. A second group of states was inclined to believe 
that Rwandans' lack of cooperation with UNAMIR justified the closing of the mission. Finally, countries 
that had contributed troops to the mission expressed deep concerns for the security of their nationals.   
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unspeakable savagery[,] the UN continued to behave as if Rwanda represented a 
conventional problem of political reconciliation."31 It was not until May that the 
Secretary General was clear enough and used the term genocide. Shamefully, "the 
Clinton administration was by then twisting itself into rhetorical knots" to avoid using the 
term for fear that this somehow would imply the automatic implementation of 
"provisions of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which requires signatories to 'prevent and punish' such crimes."32   
 Finally, by the beginning of May, the Security Council had agreed to task the 
United Nations Secretariat with the development of an unofficial plan to reinforce the 
mission. Inside of Rwanda, Dallaire proposed an additional contingent of fifty-five 
hundred men to be deployed in areas where Tutsis had concentrated. His plan was clear, 
and from the ground it made perfect sense. Contrary to the situation in Somalia where the 
danger was coming from well armed factions, in Rwanda, it was "a bunch of thugs armed 
with machetes"33 that was slaughtering masses. 
 Yet, invoking the disaster in Somalia, the United States opposed Dallaire's plan. 
Instead, the Clinton administration proposed logistic support to implement a different 
operation. As United States' officials explained to the Peacekeeping Department, 
Rwandans at risk had already left the country and they could be protected in refugee 
camps outside of Rwanda. But the strategy made no sense since Dallaire was describing 
how thousands were being massacred per day. By May 17th, the United States finally 
agreed on a resolution, and the Security Council authorized the deployment of only eight 
hundred men.  
                                                 
31
 Traub 2006, p. 57. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid, p. 58. 
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 At this point, as Traub explains, not even this weak gesture mattered "since 
neither Rwanda's neighbors nor any of the usual peacekeeping sources were willing to 
send soldiers into the Central African cauldron".34 Fortunately, on May 19th, the RPF, led 
by Paul Kagame, was able to take the capital, Kigali, and declared a ceasefire. Ironically, 
a month later, when a new government had already been established, the Peacekeeping 
Department received "the first pledge of troops"35 from a couple of states. 
 In the end, the 'ugly truth' was that members of the international community had 
"little responsibility to protect the lives of the victims of an ongoing genocide."36 As for 
the United Nations, the operation in Rwanda constituted the worst failure in the whole 
history of the organization.37 Although in Somalia, decisions taken had gone extremely 
wrong, in Rwanda, "where 800,000 people were slaughtered in one hundred days,"38 the 
United Nations had been unable in effect to intervene at all.   
 
3. 3 Bosnia 1992-1995   
 Calls for United Nations presence in the ethnically diverse Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia had started in November, 1991, when "army troops had 
massacred civilians in the Croatian town of Vukorvar."39 Croatia's Parliament had 
declared independence in June of that year, and Yugoslavia's Serb President, Slobodan 
                                                 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. p. 59. 
36
 Ibid. 
37Revisiting the events in Rwanda, an independent inquiry observed: "While UNAMIR [had been] 
established to monitor a peace agreement, 'the onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers 
in the United Nations [...] to realize that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the 
United Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with 
the means necessary to take such action'." 
Ibid. 
38
 Ibid, pp. 50-51. 
39
 Ibid, p. 42. 
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Milosevic, had launched a military campaign supposedly aimed at ensuring the unity of 
the Federation. By December, a small group of United Nations unarmed military 
observers had been deployed to monitor a ceasefire line that had been negotiated by the 
European Union.   
 Yet, even before authorizing any type of armed operation, Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali expressed his discomfort with the idea of the organization's 
presence in the Balkans. In his view, not only were there so many other, more terrible 
conflicts around the world, but this was "a white man's war",40 thus a European problem. 
In turn, although Lord Carrington41 had commented that "the hour of Europe [had] 
come",42 it seemed like Europeans were only willing to be the protagonists of the 
diplomatic effort. It was clear from French and British statements that support from the 
ground was to be assumed by the United Nations. 
 Calls for the deployment of peacekeepers to Bosnia started in April, 1992, when 
the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces surrounded Sarajevo. After 
dispatching an envoy to the area, the Secretary General informed the Security Council 
that since there was no peace to keep, conditions were not ripe for sending in 
peacekeepers. Nevertheless, in June UNPROFOR43 was enlarged to include infantry. As 
stated by the Council, in resolution 761, the mission's goals would be "to ensure the 
security and functioning of Sarajevo's airport and the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance"44 to civilians.  
 After the shelling of Srebrenica's market, Council members agreed on the 
                                                 
40
 Ibid, p. 43. 
41
 Chief negotiator for the European Union in the Balkans. 
42
 Traub 2006, p. 42. 
43
 United Nations Protection Force 
44
 S/RES/761, June 29, 1992. 
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establishment of a safe area around the town, to be protected by peacekeepers. 
Considering increasing levels of ethnic violence, the idea of safe havens was later 
extended to incorporate four towns with predominately Muslim populations.  
 Since this task was unprecedented for peacekeepers, UNPROFOR officials began 
questioning the implementation of the policy. As seen by the mission's commander, the 
idea of safe areas implied that peacekeepers had to side openly with one of the parties to 
the conflict. Nevertheless, in order to follow the Council's orders, he requested an 
additional seventy thousand troops. Boutros Boutros Ghali then presented two plans to 
the Council. The first one was constructed in terms of UNPROFORs request, the second, 
to deploy a small number of peacekeepers, and to back them with the threat of air strikes. 
The Council adopted the second approach and authorized an additional contingent of 
seventy-six hundred men. The decision proved catastrophic.  
 In effect, although the protection of endangered populations within safe areas had 
been conceived as a 'temporary' option, which meant "until the Serbs accepted the so-
called Vance-Owen peace plan",45 when the plan failed, ethnic violence rose, but air 
strikes did not follow, the policy became counterproductive. Not only were Serbs getting 
the message that the United Nations was bluffing, but with lightly armed peacekeepers, 
Bosnian Muslims had become easy targets!  
 Moreover, increasing violence was facilitated, in practice, by a mute Secretariat, 
and divided Council members. As early as 1994, protected towns such as Srebrenica, 
Gorazde, and Bihac were becoming outright 'killing zones', yet neither the Secretary 
General nor the Security Council would do anything about it until mid-1995.    
 Serb forces launched the final assault on Srebrenica on July 6, 1995. The town fell 
                                                 
45
 Traub 2006, p. 45. 
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on July 11th after desperate calls from Dutch peacekeepers for air support were ignored. 
Traub described the scene: 
 
 [I]t was clear that something terrible [happened] to the town's Muslim population: the Serbs had 
deported women, children and the elderly. [Initially] '4000 draft-aged males' could not be accounted for[...] 
In the end, the Bosnian Serbs killed about seventy-four hundred men and boys - by far the greatest atrocity 
in Europe since World War II.46 
 
 Shamefully, only after Milosevic's forces had crossed the last possible line by 
successfully implementing his ethnic-cleansing policy, did Security Council members 
concur on how to proceed. In an emergency meeting on July 21st, allied leaders agreed 
that NATO "would no longer give the UN a veto over bombing decisions."47 Soon after 
Serbian militias encircled the rest of the protected areas, the Clinton administration 
communicated its intention to start the air campaign with, or without European support. 
On August 30th, two days after a Serb explosive killed thirty-seven more people in 
Sarajevo, NATO strikes began. Operation Deliberate Force would continue "until the 
Bosnian Serb leadership... signed a draft of a peace agreement two weeks later."48 
 
3. 4 Kosovo 1999 
 Calls for the United Nations to be a presence in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia started in 1998. Yet, Kosovo was not going to become a United Nations 
issue.49  
                                                 
46
 Ibid, p. 49. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 At least initially. 
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 Since the beginning of the year, facilitated by an increasing number of weapons 
flowing from Albania, Kosovars were moving from peaceful resistance to Milosevic's 
rule, to a more militarized stance towards the Yugoslav government. At the same time, 
Serb forces were moving from retaliating against KLA50 leaders and their families, to 
collective punishments towards predominately Albanian and Muslim populations. 
 Despite an active Secretariat51 that started calling attention to the escalating 
conflict as early as May, Russia, a historical Serb ally, which at the time was facing 
similar problems in Chechnya, was determined to protect Milosevic's rule over the Serb 
Province.  
 Indeed, the Russians were very clear. In September, when the Security Council 
was able to pass a resolution declaring that increasing levels of ethnic violence 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, "demanding that Serb forces be 
confined to their garrison, and [calling on the parties to seek] a negotiated solution to 
Kosovo's bid for secession[, t]he Russian ambassador insisted that the resolution did not 
authorize force should Serbs fail to comply."52  
 In October, pressed by threats of NATO's air strikes, Milosevic declared he would 
cooperate with the Council's resolution by allowing observers. Yet, "the Serbs were not 
about to be deterred by unarmed monitors [and t]he violence, the bouts of ethnic 
cleansing, grew more brutal."53 This time however, Milosevic was seriously 
miscalculating the limits of the Clinton administration's patience.   
                                                 
50
 Kosovo Liberation Army. 
51
 Kofi Annan was elected Secretary General of the United Nations in December, 1996. Previously he had 
served as head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations since 1993. That experience had greatly 
molded his position on the issue. 
52
 Traub 2006, p. 94. 
53
 Ibid, p. 95. 
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 By mid January, having no intention on waiting until the Council's paralysis 
would diffuse, as in Bosnia, and responding to the assassination of forty-five Kosovars in 
the town of Racak, "NATO began to prepare its war machinery, while the Bosnia Contact 
Group[,]54 which had been coordinating diplomatic efforts, called for a last-ditch attempt 
at negotiations."55  
 Once diplomacy at Rambouillet failed, Paul Heinbecker, Canadian Ambassador to 
the United Nations and then President of the Security Council, tried for the last time to 
persuade Council members to authorize a collective enforcement operation. Determined 
to stop Milosevic, and conscious of Russia's intention to continue to exercise its veto, 
NATO launched its seventy-two day long bombing campaign on March 24, 1999.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Russia. 
55
 Traub 2006, p. 95. 
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4. Trying to Start the Debate 
 In the aftermath of Kosovo, with the world divided between those who felt that 
NATO's unauthorized intervention to save Kosovar Albanians had been legitimate, and 
the majority of states who thought of it as having disastrous consequences for the 
international order that the United Nations had helped to build since 1945,56 former 
Secretary General Kofi Annan decided to make human security and intervention the 
themes of his next report to the General Assembly in September of 1999.  
  
 [In his speech,] Annan argued that the State was the servant of the people and that the 'sovereignty 
of the individual' was enhanced by a growing respect of human rights. State sovereignty therefore implied a 
responsibility to protect individual sovereigns. The role of the UN was to assist states in their fulfillment of 
their responsibilities and achievement of their sovereignty. This much was clearly set out in the UN 
Charter, Annan reiterated. The question however, was one of how to determine the 'common interest' in 
particular cases. In a case such as that of Kosovo, did sovereignty as responsibility require intervention, 
and, if so, who was entitled to take this decision? Answering his own questions, Annan [focused on three 
critical points.] First, a principle of intervention should be 'fairly and consistently applied'. Second, it 
should embrace a 'more broadly defined, more widely conceived definition of national interest'. In other 
words[,] decision-makers should make decisions on the basis of the common good not on the basis of 
national interests. Third, the proper authority was the Security Council, but the Council should accept its 
responsibilities and make a commitment to respond to humanitarian emergencies.57  
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 Not surprisingly, Annan's approach was not only questioned58 but formally 
repudiated. As stated by the G77, "the doctrine of humanitarian intervention [was] an 
unacceptable violation of state sovereignty."59  
 Yet, Annan's initial failure was the beginning of a bigger effort.60 A year later, the 
Secretary General reiterated his message in his 2000 Millennium Summit Report, and 
"[a]t the 2000 convening of the General Assembly, Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien announced that he would impanel a commission to study the issues that Annan 
had raised."61  
 This commission, that became known as the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be responsible for reframing the terms 
of the debate by developing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. However, 
because the Responsibility to Protect is built over the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty 
as Responsibility, the next section will first explore Deng's work.  
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5. Re-conceptualizing Sovereignty 
 Through the nineteen nineties, the realization that the end of the Cold War 
revealed a vacuum of responsibility for the management of internal conflicts and their 
humanitarian consequences, and that the United Nations was failing to adapt to the 
emerging challenges and dynamics of conflict prone areas, confronted the international 
community with a substantive dilemma - how to bridge the gap between international 
ideals, such as the protection of basic rights, and on-the-ground realities in sovereign 
countries such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, where internal conflicts 
and gross human rights violations had been fueled by state failure or partisan authorities' 
unwillingness to protect segments of the population. 
 Because, in principle, providing local solutions to local problems counts for a 
high degree of legitimacy, and because, in practice, external assistance to safeguard 
effectively populations in need of protection is greatly facilitated by governments' 
cooperation, the challenge "is one of how to negotiate sovereignty, how to engage 
governments in a constructive dialogue that would bridge sovereignty and responsibility, 
that would turn sovereignty from being a barricade against the outside world, into a 
positive challenge of a state's responsibility for its people,"62 and to do it within a 
framework able to unite state responsibility and accountability into a principle for 
political action, at both the national and international levels. 
 
5.1 From Sovereignty as Control to Sovereignty as Responsibility  
 To explain the basis for conceptualizing Sovereignty as Responsibility, Deng et 
al. start from the premise that the institution of state sovereignty is to be understood in its 
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historical context. Indeed, although established in the post-Thirty Years War in Europe 
through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty has advanced through at least four 
overlapping phases.  
  Sovereignty "was initially conceived as an instrument of authoritative control by 
the monarch over feudal princes in the construction of modern territorial states."63 
Accordingly, the basic premise of this period was that the primary goal of the state 64 was 
to "maintain order through an effective exercise of sovereignty."65 Utilized in this 
context, sovereignty was understood by legal scholars like Austin, as an attribute of 
power, which placed authority above the law, law being a reflection of the sovereign's 
will. In other words, sovereign rule was absolute and not to be constrained, and although 
restrictions to authority were possible, they would result from acts or discretion of the 
sovereign.  
 The second phase in the development of sovereignty can be dated to 1945. "[T]he 
Nuremberg trials and the mounting humanitarian and human rights movement following 
World War II represent a clear demarcation line for the erosion of sovereignty."66 The 
legal dispute in 1945 and 1946 was not if Nazi atrocities committed during war time 
constituted crimes against humanity, but if it was necessary or not to pass new legislation 
to declare Nazi law illegal retroactively. As posited by those such as Hart, retroactive 
legislation was necessary. Contrariwise, basing his views on the intrinsic ethics of law, 
Fuller contended that Nazi "laws had so violated the fundamental principles of morality 
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and human dignity as to have ceased to be law."67 
 Prompted by the level of destruction, as well as by the humanitarian costs 
resulting from the war, the United Nations was created not only as an organization to 
promote friendly relations among nations, and to enforce the prohibition of the use of 
force in international relations, but also to promote human rights standards, their 
protection, and to facilitate human rights law codification. As posited by Buergenthal, 
despite the vagueness of the human rights provisions set forth in the United Nations 
Charter, articles 1(3), 55 and 56 proved to have important effects.68 "In time, the 
membership of the United Nations came to accept the proposition that the Charter had 
internationalized the concept of human rights."69   
 Explaining this process, Deng et al. tell us that although not fully elaborated, basic 
human rights norms were adopted by member states around the United Nations system 
via the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
This corpus of law provides the basis for the essential premise of human rights law. In 
simple terms, "to qualify for the name of government, a government now has to meet 
certain standards, all of which involve restraints in the use of power: no torture, no 
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brutalization... no state terror... no discrimination... and so on."70 In other words, these 
agreed-to responsibilities by sovereign states imply acknowledging "[h]umanity [as] the 
raison d'etre of any legal system",71 recognizing that many states were failing in fulfilling 
their "primary function, namely the protection and development of the human dignity of 
the individual,"72 and accepting that "the normative principles of governance should 
emphasize state protection for the individual [both through] the provision of the essential 
requirements of life,"73 and through the protection of basic human rights.   
 These premises not only "impose on the international community a correlative 
responsibility for their enforcement,"74 but constituted the basis for operation of the right 
of self-determination during the decolonization process. As Deng et al. tell us, sanctions 
against apartheid practices in South Africa were an effective measure to expand 
sovereignty as responsibility, a process which has been reinforced in time, by increasing 
waves of democratization, as well as by the increasing codification of international law 
instruments within the United Nations system.  
 In effect, sovereignty finds limits, and at the same time expands in specific areas, 
through ratification of international agreements such as the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These 
treaties are legally binding and provide a valid and legitimate base for United Nations 
practices such as "on-site monitoring and visits, criticism, condemnations, sanctions and 
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even armed intervention."75 
 As demonstrated by post-Cold War dynamics, the advancement and expansion of 
the human rights regime have been impressive. When compared to the Cold War era, the 
nineteen nineties had been characterized by an explosion of humanitarian assistance 
missions, and peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations Security 
Council. 
 However, precisely because the issue of humanitarian intervention represents the 
greatest erosion to the traditional conceptualization of sovereignty, is that the third phase 
of its evolution "emerged as a reactive assertion of sovereignty by governments whose 
domestic performance renders them vulnerable to international scrutiny."76 Still, even 
supporters of a more liberal conceptualization of sovereignty admitted the existing 
tension between the expansion of sovereignty as responsibility, and the erosion of state 
sovereignty as a fundamental institution to facilitate peaceful relations among nations.77 
As questioned by former Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in 1991, after affirming the 
irreversible expansion of humanitarian and human rights standards: "[D]on't these 
premises call into question one of the cardinal principles of international law, one 
diametrically opposed to it, namely, the obligation of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States?"78 79 
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 Answering this question a few years later, former Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali argued for the need to balance the international community's concerns with 
the need of good governance at the level of states. In this view, at the same time that 
fulfillment of sovereign responsibilities had become the best way to protect national 
sovereignty, broader cooperation was still necessary.80 81  
 This perspective takes us to the current period in the development of sovereignty - 
a period characterized by a pragmatic effort to reaffirm the centrality of the institution as 
well as to clarify its parameters.  
  
5. 2 Sovereignty as Responsibility as an Individual and Collective Framework 
 
 [In simple terms, conceptualizing Sovereignty as Responsibility, means] to recognize internal 
conflicts and their consequences as falling within the domestic jurisdiction and therefore national 
sovereignty of the country concerned. However, it is also recognized, that sovereignty carries with it certain 
responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And that they are accountable not only to 
their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by effectively 
discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its 
national sovereignty.82  
 
 Sovereignty as Responsibility as a standard for government behavior is especially 
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relevant in the context of conflict prone areas in Africa, where, as Deng et al. tell us, the 
absence of adequate institutions to manage diversity during the post-independence period 
made "conflict over power wealth, and development"83 unavoidable.  
 As the authors explain, misunderstood post-colonial objectives84 resulted in 
policies that essentially led to pervasive patterns characterized by "gross violations of 
human rights, denial of civil liberties, disruption of economic and social life, and 
consequent frustration of development."85  
 The case of Rwanda, where Hutus are the majority of the population, provides a 
good example to illustrate this point. After independence in 1962, Tutsi domination, that 
had been reinforced by brutal colonial administrations, was simply replaced by Hutu 
repression. After all, the RPF was composed basically of Tutsi refugees who, since 
independence, had been escaping from Hutu government persecution and suppressive 
practices.  
 
 [Learning the lessons from Rwanda suggests that] it is not the differences in identity, whether real 
or perceived, that generate conflict, but rather the implications of those differences in terms of equitable 
access to power and resources, social services, development opportunities and the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms.  
 Seen in this light, early prevention becomes a challenge of good governance and equitable 
management of diversity. That means eliminating gross inequalities, discrimination and promoting a 
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common sense of belonging, a responsibility that all states... have towards their people.86 
  
 It is precisely because of this responsibility of governments, that sovereignty 
"becomes a pooled function to be protected when exercised responsibly, and to be shared 
when help is needed."87 In other words, Sovereignty as Responsibility conceptualizes a 
framework based on cooperation, in which members of the international community 
exercise responsibilities in the form of increasing 'layers of assistance', in the event of 
incapacity or reluctance of national authorities to govern. 
 Precisely because many internal conflicts are embedded in regional ones, and 
because domestic instability has the potential of spreading to one's neighborhood, is that 
regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as neighbors, are the first called to share 
responsibility by constructively guiding members, or neighbors, by assisting them in 
fulfilling their responsibilities, and by responding in the most appropriate manner when 
required.  
 Ultimately, because it is a stated mission of the United Nations to create the 
"conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations",88 and because one of its stated purposes is to achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character by 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights,89 the United Nations is called upon 
to actively advance and support sovereignty as shared responsibility as a framework for 
political action at the national and international levels.  
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 In this respect, considering that the goal is to create a coherent and effective 
system able to assist states and to protect populations, sharing responsibility requires the 
United Nations to take the lead in at least four specific areas.  
 First, considering that there is still debate "whether or not existing law provides 
adequate basis for a comprehensive system of international protection and assistance"90 
for endangered populations, it is crucial to restate existing obligations contained in 
agreed-to international instruments in order "to clarify the legal bases and introduce any 
reforms."91   
 Second, considering that the political will of international actors is essential to 
provide protection and assistance for populations in need, "the formulation of guiding 
principles may be as important, if not more so, as the promulgation of legally binding 
standards."92  
 Third, considering that interventions in the name of humanitarian purposes were 
abused by powerful nations in the past, the United Nations should state coherent 
principles for the use of force when the goal is to protect populations, and should have 
the main "responsibility for determining the existence of humanitarian crises that 
threatened international peace and security or otherwise justify international action."93  
 Fourth, and perhaps the most important, considering that Western engagement in 
ongoing crisis is frequently prompted by "the gravity of the tragedies involved",94 direct 
preventive efforts, as well as structural prevention measures, need to be stressed and 
further developed.  
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 Finally, the United Nations is called upon to play an active role in the areas of 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution by utilizing all tools at its disposal. As Deng et 
al. tell us, such a quest had already been outlined by Boutros Boutros Ghali. In his view, 
the goals of the United Nations should be considered with a broad perspective including: 
to identify conflict prone situations at their earliest possible stages, and to intervene by 
utilizing diplomatic tools; to engage in peacemaking when conflict initially erupted; to 
preserve peace through peacekeeping operations, and to provide assistance to parties to 
implement agreed-to peace frameworks; and to assist in peace-building initiatives, in the 
form of institutional reform, infrastructure recovery, or national reconciliation measures.  
 As explained by Deng et al., what "is envisaged can be conceptualized as a three-
phase strategy that would include monitoring the development to draw early attention to 
impending crises, interceding in time to avert the crises through diplomatic initiatives, 
and mobilizing international action when necessary."95 
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6. Reframing the Terms of the Debate 
 Aiming to achieve consensus on a legitimate and comprehensive strategy through 
which the international community could reconcile the so called 'sovereignty-
intervention' dilemma, Canada's Prime Minister announced the creation of the ICISS in 
September, 2000. As noted by Canada's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, "[t]he ICISS 
was to outline appropriate and politically feasible international responses to massive 
human rights violations and to set ways of preventing such violations."96  
 Precisely because what was needed was the strongest possible consensus, 
commissioners were selected from all regions. The ICISS was chaired by Gareth Evans97 
and Mohamed Sahnoun,98 from Australia and Algeria respectively. Of the other ten 
commissioners, five represented Western countries,99 and five represented the far flung 
South Africa, Guatemala, the Philippines, India and Russia. To promote further 
international participation, the ICISS "organized a series of 11 roundtables and national 
consultations attended by the commissioners and participants from the academy, 
governments and non-governmental sector."100 Furthermore, in order to take advantage of 
similar efforts, the commission also engaged with parallel working groups such as the 
Rio Group and the Pugwash Study Group. 
 As pointed out by Bellamy, although positions previously taken in the Pugwash 
Group's workshops of late 1999 and September, 2000 by delegates of countries such as 
China, "painted a gloomy picture for the ICISS,"101 they were also indicative that even 
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the strongest adversaries of humanitarian intervention were not opposed to it in all cases. 
In this respect, the challenge was to agree on which situations triggered the necessity of 
international reaction, as well as to clarify the procedure, and to identify the right 
authority to make those decisions. The delegates of the Pugwash Study Group had also 
deemed crucial that to effectively respond to emerging challenges, timely reaction was 
just one of the capacities that needed to be further developed and perfected. In the 
delegates' views, 'intervention' should be understood "as one stage in a continuum of 
international support for efforts to prevent and limit human suffering."102  
 Accordingly, much of the focus of the ICISS centered on what the Pugwash and 
Rio Groups identified as most relevant: "criteria for intervention, institutions/authority 
and modalities."103  
 
6. 1 The Road to the ICISS Report 
 The ICISS met for the first time in Ottawa on January 15, 2001. Considering the 
terms of the post-Kosovo debate, and the nature of the issues at stake, Evans and 
Sahnoun announced that, following the example of the Brundtland Commission - which 
during the late eighties had coined the term 'sustainable development' - the goal of the 
ICISS was to develop a framework able to transcend the negative perceptions of 
intervention, when the intent or purpose was to assist and protect endangered populations. 
Humanitarian intervention as an expression needed to be replaced for at least for two 
reasons. First, humanitarian agencies insisted that the term 'humanitarian' should not be 
used to refer to any type of action that implied acts of war. Second, commissioners such 
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as Ramesh Thakur from India, rightly argued that the term itself had negative historical 
connotations. 
 During the Ottawa meeting, commissioners also expressed their views on the 
utility of establishing criteria for the use of force, as well as on the modalities for 
preventing and responding to mass atrocities. On the first point, some commissioners 
argued that the development of guiding principles for decision-makers could be helpful, 
but others were skeptical. On the issue of modalities, the commissioners agreed on the 
necessity of coordination among "civilian and military agencies in developing long-term 
strategies to prevent massive human suffering."104  
 Before the beginning of the commission's second meeting, to be held in Geneva, 
Evans "came up with the idea of reframing the debate in terms of a 'responsibility to 
protect'."105 As it was presented by Evans, the idea was able to clarify and resolve four 
issues that had been raised previously: 
  
 First, the almost exclusive focus on military intervention was misplaced. If the aim was to 
strengthen international protection for basic human rights, it was necessary to consider a much wider 
continuum of activities. Second, resistance to humanitarian intervention was grounded in legitimate 
historical sensitivities about colonialism and self-determination. Third, the search for new legal rules to 
govern intervention was not a promising avenue of enquiry. Not only was the possibility of consensus slim, 
but new legal rules would not guarantee the protection of endangered peoples. Finally, more attention 
should be given to the responsibilities of different actors.106  
   
 In Geneva, the commissioners again focused on the issues of criteria and 
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modalities. Perhaps the most important contribution of the gathering was the participants' 
agreement that not only the prevention of mass atrocities was crucial but, if military 
intervention for human protection was to take place, "long-term plans for rebuilding after 
conflict"107 were necessary. Yet, concerned that the responsibility to rebuild could be 
seen as a form of neo-colonialism by intervention opponents, the commissioners stressed 
that "rebuilding around local empowerment"108 provided the right answer.  
 After the conclusion of the Geneva meeting, the issue of the utility of criteria on 
the use of force in the event of military intervention began to create divisions among the 
commissioners. Representing views from the developing world, Thakur argued that the 
existence of guiding principles was necessary not to legitimize intervene actions, but to 
"actually restrain intervention."109 Taking the argument further, participants at the New 
Dehli roundtable not only reiterated the necessity of guiding criteria, but for their 
application only "by a legitimate and representative body [adding] that a reformed 
Security Council was the best candidate for this role."110  
 Yet the West remained skeptical. As noted by some during the London 
roundtable, the existence of criteria would play no significant role in shaping the political 
behavior of Security Council members. Others rejected altogether the idea of establishing 
criteria for intervention on the basis of this being an intrinsically divisive matter. Also, as 
pointed out by French officials during the Paris roundtable, the existence of criteria could 
be counterproductive, as it could encourage groups to increase existent levels of violence 
in order to capture international attention.  
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 Commissioners and roundtables participants also expressed differing views on 
"which institutions had the authority to sanction the use of force or other coercive 
measures."111 Although everybody agreed that the Security Council had the main 
responsibility to authorize enforcement operations, some participants at the Maputo 
roundtable expressed reservations about the idea that the Council be the only source of 
authority, pointing to cases in which regional organizations had acted in the absence of 
Council authorization such as ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, which had been ratified 
a posteriori by the Council. "Regional measures also prompted the delegates at St. 
Petersburg to refrain from denouncing all non-UN sanctioned interventions, primarily 
because Russia had itself intervened in several conflicts in the former Soviet space 
through the Commonwealth of Independent States."112   
 Only during the Washington roundtable did some participants argue that Security 
Council authorization was not necessary, but preferable. Defenders of this view posited 
that in cases of unauthorized intervention, the operation could be legitimized if the 
guiding criteria on the use of force had been met.  
 During the Paris roundtable, Hubert Vedrine posited that while unauthorized 
intervention might be the only option in some cases, the real challenge was not one of 
how to legitimize interventions outside of the United Nations, but of how to make the 
Security Council work better. In his view, the establishment of a code of conduct for the 
Security Council could help. "The code would contain clear thresholds for what counted 
as a humanitarian crisis requiring a Security Council response and an agreement of the P5 
not to cast their veto in cases where [the majority of the Council favored intervention, 
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unless] national security interests were at risk."113 The position was welcomed by the 
commissioners for two reasons. First, considering concerns that had been raised, 
Vedrine's idea provided a way to advance the complex debate. Second, the formula 
"provided a neat link between the [Responsibility to Protect and criteria]: the Security 
Council should be encumbered with a responsibility to protect and empowered to make 
effective and timely decisions in the discharge of its responsibilities."114 
 Finally, broad consensus around three issues had emerged among commissioners 
concerning the modalities of the Responsibility to Protect. First, the Responsibility to 
Protect should encompass not only timely reaction, but also prevention strategies and 
rebuilding efforts. Second, the Responsibility to Protect should ultimately focus on the 
empowerment of local populations. Third, there was need for the creation of an "early 
warning and response mechanism to alert the world to potential crises and to coordinate 
responses."115 
 Once agreement on the basics of the concept was built among the commissioners, 
the Beijing roundtable116 represented the last critical step in the potential development of 
international consensus on the notion of the Responsibility to Protect. The challenge? 
Chinese delegates focused on the issues at stake almost exclusively from a 'humanitarian 
intervention' perspective.  
 
 The meeting opened with a paper which argued that humanitarian intervention was 'a total fallacy' 
because it had no basis in law, being derived from a fallacious view of human rights as 'transcending' 
sovereignty, and that its Western advocates had not seriously pursued a policy of protecting human rights. 
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[Yet, as pointed out by Bellamy, all] was not lost[.] The Chinese went on to argue that, whilst humanitarian 
intervention was fallacious, humanitarianism was not. In fact, humanitarianism was a 'lofty virtue' which 
could be pursued through the Security Council.117  
   
 This last point was crucial. The commissioners could hope for gradual Chinese 
support for the concept so long as the military dimension of the Responsibility to Protect 
operated under Security Council approval.  
 
6. 2 The Report's Contribution 
 The ICISS report entitled The Responsibility to Protect was presented to the world 
on December 18, 2001. At its release, Paul Heinbecker "declared his confidence that 'the 
thoughtfulness of this report, with its clear political and practical focus, provides a solid 
basis for advancing this issue within the UN system'. "118  
 Based on the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as Responsibility, as previously 
developed by Francis Deng, the report stresses that states have the primary responsibility 
to protect their populations from mass atrocities, and that in cases where states are unable 
or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities, the responsibility to protect is transferred to 
the international community.      
 As emphasized by the ICISS co-chairs, reframing the debate in these terms offers 
three specific advantages to solve the so called sovereignty-intervention dilemma. First, 
this approach benefits those who need protection the most - the victims whose rights are 
grossly violated in the context of internal conflicts, or who are being persecuted or 
massacred by radical groups or state agents. Second, the concept is one that stresses 
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national accountability. The primary responsibility lays with states "and the communities 
and institutions within them."119 Only when states are unable or unwilling to protect their 
populations, does the international community have a residual responsibility to intervene 
to protect human beings, and to take measures to ameliorate the effects of potential crises. 
Third, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect differs from that of humanitarian 
intervention in the sense that it is not an open door for military action, but is broader, and 
does not necessarily imply coercion.  
 As defined by the ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect comprises three 
responsibilities: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.120 Moreover, because preventing the 
conditions that may lead to the commission of mass atrocities constitutes the most 
effective strategy to avoid them in the first place, the ICISS report emphasizes that the 
responsibility to prevent is "the single most important dimension"121 of the Responsibility 
to Protect.  
 Yet, since the report focused most of its recommendations on the reactive 
component of the framework,122 it "made it difficult for advocates to build international 
support for"123 the final work of the ICISS. Nevertheless, the commissioner's work did 
make a crucial contribution: its work resulted in reframing the debate in a way that 
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potentially could generate broader international consensus. As Bellamy observes:  
 
 [The] deep-seated skepticism towards intervention did not necessarily translate into a rejection of 
the underlying purpose of [the Responsibility to Protect] - the prevention and amelioration of genocide and 
mass atrocities. Indeed in the commission's own consultations, there was a clear consensus on the 
importance of shifting away from the non-consensual use of force to protect civilians, within a broader 
continuum of measures, including prevention. The commission's adoption of a language focusing on the 
rights of endangered civilians rather than on the rights of potential interveners helped to illuminate a broad 
constituency of states and civil society actors prepared to acknowledge that sovereignty entailed 
responsibilities and the legitimacy of international involvement in protecting people from genocide and 
mass atrocities.124 
 
 As a consequence, as an expression, the Responsibility to Protect would survive. 
However as we will see, its core principles, particularly those concerning the use of force, 
would require important revisions.  
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Box 1 
 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
(1)  THE JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD 
 
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. 
To be warranted, there must be a serious harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to 
occur, of the following kind: 
 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the 
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state 
situation; or 
 
B.  large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended , whether carried out by killing, 
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.  
 
(2)  THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES 
 
A.  Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives 
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better 
assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims 
concerned.  
 
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for 
the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for 
believing lesser measures would not have succeeded. 
 
C.  Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention 
should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.  
 
D.  Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or 
averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not 
likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.  
 
(3) RIGHT AUTHORITY 
 
A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to 
authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives 
to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than 
it has.  
 
B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military 
intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request 
such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the 
Secretary- General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.  
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C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where 
there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context 
seek adequate verification of facts on conditions on the ground that might support a military 
intervention.  
 
D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto 
power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of 
resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is 
otherwise majority support.  
 
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, 
alternative options are: 
 I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under 
the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure; and 
 II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter 
VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.  
 
F.  The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to 
discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, 
concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation - and 
that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.   
 
(4)  OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
 
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match. 
 
B. Common military approach among involved partners, unity of command; clear and 
unequivocal communications and chain of command.  
 
C.  Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the 
objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.  
 
D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of 
proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.  
 
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.  
 
F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.  
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7. A Persistent but Flexible Effort 
 As soon as the ICISS released its report in late 2001, Canadian officials actively 
began pursuing a double strategy aimed "to mobilize civil society to act both as advocate 
and as agents of implementation, while at the same time leading an inter-governmental 
process to gauge support for the [Responsibility to Protect], to identify political obstacles 
and to build a group of 'like-minded' 'friends'."125 As seen by Canada, active engagement 
in these areas provided the possibility to sell the emerging framework in two manners: 
first, through a 'norm building approach', in which states could be persuaded to utilize 
Responsibility to Protect language in declarations and resolutions; second, through an 
'operationalisation approach', which implied to focus "on practical initiatives towards 
increasing the physical protection of civilians."126 
  Responding to Canada's call, non-governmental organizations generated 
important insights on best ways of advancing the framework.127 As seen by these actors, 
it was crucial to stress the preventive dimension of the Responsibility to Protect. As 
important, when considering that "operationalisation was likely to deliver more 
consensus and actual protection,"128 it was imperative to advocate "for the commitment of 
resources for conflict prevention and support for the development of international 
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policing capacity and the mandates of UN representatives and advisers on protection 
issues such as IDPs and the prevention of genocide."129   
    The second part of the Canadian strategy, aimed at direct engagement with 
government officials, helped the Canadian government and other Responsibility to 
Protect supporters to realize that although a majority of governments could be persuaded 
to accept that states had the responsibility to protect their populations from mass 
atrocities, it was necessary still to address governments' concerns on the potential 
implications of the ICISS framework.  
 Security Council permanent members had expressed their concerns during the 
Council's annual retreat in May, 2002. Uncertainty on the criteria to guide the use of 
force was the main problem for the United States. As seen by the Bush administration, 
American sovereign decisions on matters such as when and where to intervene could end 
up being constrained. In turn, France and the United Kingdom expressed concerns about 
the ability of criteria to generate political will on the part of Security Council members to 
intervene when required. For this reason, as the ICISS's report, they argued that the use of 
force in the absence of Security Council approval should not be condemned in all cases. 
China expressed concerns in the opposite direction, stating that commitment to the letter 
of the United Nations Charter was not negotiable: any question related to the use of force 
was to be deferred to the Security Council only. Russia, as well as China, also stressed 
the position that "the UN was already equipped to deal with humanitarian crisis."130  
 As for the G77, the group was also divided and "suggested that the report should 
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be revised so as to emphasize the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty."131 
Finally, "[t]he Non Aligned Movement (NAM) flatly rejected"132 the Responsibility to 
Protect. In the eyes of one its leading members, India, the problem at the Security 
Council level during humanitarian emergencies was not a lack of authority to act, but a 
lack of political will to act when necessary. As seen by Nirupam Sen:133  
 
 [The Responsibility to Protect]  'should be addressed with necessary caution and responsibility', 
since 'we do not believe that discussions on the question should be used as a cover for conferring any 
legitimacy on the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention" or making it the ideology of some kind of 
"military humanism"'. 134     
  
 To make matters worse, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 exacerbated negative 
perceptions on the potential implications of the emerging framework. As pointed out by 
Weiss, although humanitarian motives could "have been invoked [as a potential 
justification for intervention] in March, 1988 - when Sadam used chemical weapons 
against the Kurdish city of Halabja in northern Iraq, instantly killing 5,000 civilians - or 
on numerous other occasions in the 1990s," that was clearly not the case in 2003. In 
effect, only when the existence of weapons of mass destruction inside of Iraq proved 
unsustainable, was the operation justified in humanitarian terms. 135 
 As posited by Bellamy, although it is impossible to judge the impact that the 
event had on opponents of the framework, the incident did limit the terms of what 
supporters of the Responsibility to Protect were prepared to advocate for. This was 
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demonstrated "during a forum of social democratic political leaders" held on July 14, 
2003, in which Argentina, Chile and Germany, "rejected sections of a draft communiqué 
proposed by Tony Blair and Jean Chrétien [which contained] language clearly 
reminiscent of"136 the Responsibility to Protect.137 Representatives from the three 
countries opposed the draft's "wording, reportedly 'believing it could be used to justify 
the military campaign in Iraq'."138 
 Nevertheless, the event led supporting governments to emphasize the necessity of 
truly multilateral responses to potential humanitarian crises. For instance, in 2004, 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder declared the commitment of the German government to 
protecting endangered populations, stating that:  
 
 [W]hilst 'prevention does not rule out timely military intervention... this must be based on criteria 
that are in keeping with our values and basic political convictions'. ['No country can guarantee security, 
peace, and prosperity for itself and deal with the new challenges that face us by acting alone [...] German 
security policy is based on the primacy of international law and the strengthening of the United Nations.'139 
  
 Considering these developments, NGO's suggestions, and the two failed attempts 
to have the General Assembly discuss the work of the ICISS,140 Canadians began 
promoting three major changes to the commission's framework: first, that approval of 
non-consensual measures constituted a prerogative of the Security Council only; second, 
"that the 'just cause' thresholds and precautionary principles should be viewed as 
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constraints limiting governments' ability to 'abuse' humanitarian justifications[;]"141 142 
third, and considering concerns of Council members, that it was necessary to stop 
pushing for some of the measures that had being designed to make the Council work 
better.143  
 By late 2004, "not even ardent supporters [of the framework] were advocating the 
wholesale adoption of the commission's recommendations."144 Instead, key advocates 
seemed determined to forge international consensus by "watering down the concept and 
offering the world a new understanding of the [Responsibility to Protect]."145       
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8. The Role of Kofi Annan, the High Level Panel and International Practice 
 Although negative dynamics between the United States and the United Nations 
went back to 1994, when Republicans reached a majority in both houses of Congress, the 
fact that the organization had been sidelined by Americans in 2003 not only had the 
effect of questioning the relevance of the United Nations, but also of damaging further an 
already tense relationship between Kofi Annan and the Bush administration. In an 
interview given to BBC in September of that year, the Secretary General declared that in 
the absence of Security Council approval, Iraq's invasion had been technically 'illegal'. In 
turn, American officials, such as Randy Scheunemann,146 declared that the Secretary 
General's behavior was outrageous. In his view, Annan "who ultimately [worked] for the 
member states, [was trying to] supplant his judgment for the judgment of the members 
[of the United Nations]."147  
 Annan shared his concerns in his address to the General Assembly on September 
23, 2003. After reminding member states about the shared vision "of global solidarity and 
collective security" that was agreed to in the Millennium Declaration of 2000, and about 
the rules of the collective security system as established in the United Nations Charter, 
the Secretary General told his audience: 
  
 Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed [in 1945], or whether 
radical changes are needed. And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and 
effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal. Among those instruments, none is more 
important that the Security Council itself[.] The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the 
possibility that individual States may use force 'pre-emptively' against perceived threats [and] need to begin 
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a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of 
threats.148 [Also crucial, Council members] still need to engage in serious discussions of the best way to 
respond to threats of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights[.] Once again this 
year, our collective response to events of this type - in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Liberia - 
has been hesitant and tardy.149 
  
 As pointed out by Annan, in order to confront collective challenges, not only the 
Security Council but many bodies of the United Nations needed to be revised and 
possibly reformed.150 To this aim, the Secretary General informed member states of his 
intention of establishing a High Level Panel (HLP) of experts which would focus on four 
tasks: 
 
 First, to examine the current challenges to peace and security[.] Second, to consider the 
contribution which collective action can make in addressing these challenges[.] Third, to review the 
functioning of the major organs of the United Nations and the relationship within them[.] Fourth, to 
recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations, through reform of its institutions and processes.151   
 
 Among many relevant recommendations, the Report of the HLP on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, entitled A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility,152 
both "endorsed the 'emerging norm that there is a responsibility to protect', and confirmed 
the developing consensus that this norm was 'exercisable by the Security Council'."153  
 In order to improve the performance of the Security Council, the HLP reiterated 
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two ICISS recommendations - the just cause thresholds, and the precautionary principles. 
Yet, the HLP clarified possible causes that could trigger international reaction in two 
ways. First, by adding 'serious violations to international humanitarian law' to the list that 
already contained crimes such as genocide, large scale killing and ethnic cleansing. 
Second, by "insisting that the criteria would be satisfied if the threat was actual or 
'imminently apprehended' - as opposed to simply 'apprehended', as the ICISS had 
proposed."154 In addition, the HLP renamed the precautionary principles and advised 
Council members to adopt them as 'guidelines for the use of force' through a declaratory 
resolution. Finally, as had been advocated by other supporters, the HLP dropped the P5 
code of conduct. Instead, it recommended the adoption of an indicative voting system, in 
which Security Council members "could call for states to declare themselves publicly and 
to justify their positions prior to an actual vote."155    
 Kofi Annan endorsed most of the HLP recommendations in his own report for 
United Nations reform. In Larger Freedom156 reiterated the idea that states had the 
primary responsibility to protect their populations, and that only in cases where states 
proved unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations, the Security Council had the 
authority to approve enforcement operations. Perhaps the most important contribution of 
Annan's proposal was to place his recommendations in the section on the rule of law, 
while leaving the HLP guidelines for Security Council action in the section related to the 
use of force.157 As seen by the Secretary General, the move was justified because it 
highlighted the preventive facet of the emerging framework, thus distancing the  
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Responsibility to Protect from the idea of military intervention.  
 Although the endorsement by the HLP and the Secretary General were crucial for 
introducing the Responsibility to Protect to the General Assembly agenda, existing 
international practice - which involved the gradual operationalisation of Responsibility to 
Protect related principles - was also determinant for facilitating international consensus 
on the revised framework. In effect, since 1998 Security Council members had been 
working on how to incorporate the protection of civilians during armed conflicts in 
peacekeeping mandates. As a consequence, by 2005, when the United Nations reform 
package was being negotiated by member states, "[n]ot only the UN had established itself 
[at the center of civilian protection efforts], but some of those states most skeptical about 
the [Responsibility to Protect,]158 had made a physical contribution to protection through 
their involvement in UN peace operations."159  
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9. Making it to the International Agenda 
 Considering that on September of 2005 world leaders would gather at the United 
Nations to express their positions on the issues that Annan's reform package had raised,  
Jean Ping, Foreign Minister of Gabon, and then President of the General Assembly, 
began inquiring about countries postures on the Secretary General's proposals in late 
2004. In general, when consulted on the point of the Responsibility to Protect, permanent 
delegations had expressed support for a declaration that would recognize that states had 
the primary responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocities. Yet, there 
were also various concerns and opposing positions. 
 Security Council members had expressed opposition to a code of conduct to be 
followed by the P5, as it had been recommended by the ICISS. On the issue of the right 
authority, contrary to the Chinese delegation's argument that Security Council 
authorization was an imperative, the United States and the United Kingdom held that if 
operations were based on legitimate purposes, they should not be ruled out by member 
states. On the proposed guidelines for decision-making, '[w]hereas several African states, 
the [HLP] and Annan endorsed criteria as essential to making the Security Council's 
decisions more transparent, accountable (to the wider membership) and hence legitimate, 
the US, China and Russia opposed them."160 Lastly, a small group of states led by India 
argued that accepting the Responsibility to Protect implied the risk of legitimizing an 
'intervener's charter'.      
 As Bellamy tells us, although careful negotiation with delegations had led to 
significant improvements in the draft document by early August, the appointment of John 
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Bolton,161 as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, with only 
three weeks to go until the Summit proved quasi-disastrous.  
 Despite the fact that Bolton's observations on the Responsibility to Protect could 
have been accommodated in Pings draft,162 his call for a complete revision of the 
document, and for the removal of "all references to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the 'right to development' and the goal of the debt reduction[,]"163 had the effect 
of destabilizing the emerging consensus. In effect, the episode not only had the effect of 
shaking the position of some G77 countries - since the block had negotiated incorporating 
Responsibility to Protect language into Ping's draft so long as Western nations agreed to 
commit themselves to development related matters - but also, of sparkling negative 
reactions from China and Russia, which began reversing to previous positions by stating 
that the United Nations was already prepared to deal with humanitarian crises.   
 Yet, four factors were determinative for reversing the dynamics. First, advocacy 
efforts by key African and Latin American countries were persistent and demonstrated 
that support for the Responsibility to Protect did not come only from Western nations. 
Second, "last minute personal diplomacy [efforts] with major wavering-country leaders 
by Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin"164 were successful. Third, despite Bolton's 
position, Ping and members of the Secretariat had continued to work on the draft 
proposal which they distributed to permanent delegations three days ahead of the 
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Summit. Finally, United Nations complaints about the position of the American 
delegation were heard by Secretary of State Rice, who reversed Bolton's stance and 
declared the United States delegation's support for the final draft.  
 In the end, persistent efforts and careful diplomacy proved successful, since on 
September 16, 2005, while gathered in New York to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the 
United Nations, world leaders unanimously endorsed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document. As agreed by member states: 
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to 
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing early warning capability.  
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII 
of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international 
law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to 
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflict break out.  
 57 
 Although non-binding in nature, the declaration is remarkable, not only because it 
is extremely clear both when it reaffirms the fact that state authorities have the primary 
responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes and, when it 
validates the authority of the Security Council to authorize operations for human 
protection purposes, so long as peaceful means prove inadequate, and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations, but also, because it stresses prevention and 
recognizes the legitimate role of the United Nations to assist states in meeting their 
obligations. Crucially, "paragraphs 138 and 139, [began] to point to the kind of tools, 
actors and procedures that could form the basis for operationalizing [Responsibility to 
Protect] principles."165 
 Yet, as demonstrated by initial 'revolts' against the implementation of the concept 
during the 2006-2007 period by China, at the Security Council level, and by Sudan, both 
concerning the Darfur crisis ,166 one thing was to proclaim the Responsibility to Protect as 
a universal principle, and something very different was to agree on how to translate the 
noble declaration into international practice. Fortunately, "[p]romising signs began to 
emerge [...] with the election of South Korean foreign minister, Ban Ki-moon as UN 
Secretary General in October 2006[,]"167 and with the appointment of Edward Luck, in 
February of 2008, as Ban's Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.              
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10. Clarifying the Concept  
 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon proposed the creation of the position of the 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect on December of 2007. As explained to 
member states, initially, the new adviser was "to provide recommendations about 
implementing the 2005 World Summit Agreement."168 Yet, in the long term, his work 
was to complement the work of Francis Deng as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide, as "Deng [would focus] on responding to emerging crises and [the Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect] on addressing longer term policy and reform 
challenges."169 To facilitate the process, Ban also proposed the "establishment of a joint 
office for the Responsibility to Protect and for the Prevention of Genocide."   
 Although the Secretary General's suggestions initially were rejected by the 
General Assembly indirectly, when its Fifth Committee "adopted a resolution on the 
2007/8 budget without funding for Ban's proposal[,]"170 the appointment of Edward Luck 
as his Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, in early 2008,171 and his adoption 
of a consultative approach towards member states "based on a detailed dissection of the 
2005 agreement,"172 represented an important turning point for the negative perceptions 
on the potential implications of the emerging framework that had been building up since 
2005. 
 In effect, constructive engagement with delegations resulted in developing 
important conceptual clarifications. Among others, that the Responsibility to Protect, as 
conceived by member states, comprised three non-sequential but equally important 
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pillars. Also, that although the object of the Responsibility to Protect was 'narrow' - thus 
applicable only to the ongoing obligations of states to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity - a comprehensive 
approach to potential and ongoing crises by the international community needed to be 
'deep' - thus including "the whole prevention and protection toolkit available to the 
United Nations system, regional arrangements, states, and civil society."173  
 Despite the fact that the Secretary General's approach was criticized by 
commentators like Ramesh Thakur because it stress "prevention, capacity-building, and 
the primary responsibility of states rather than the dilemmas associated with humanitarian 
intervention,"174 Ban and his team insisted that in order to secure international support for 
the Responsibility to Protect, the role of the General Assembly in advancing the 
framework was crucial.  
 In their view, "all member states [needed to have] the opportunity to examine the 
principle and comment on its implementation. What might be lost in terms of momentum, 
they rationalized, would be more than compensated for in terms of legitimacy if the 
principle was moved forward on the basis of consensus."175 On this basis, the 2009 
Secretary General's Report to the General Assembly, entitled Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect,176 began by clarifying the nature and scope of the emerging 
framework, to later identify possible avenues that could help implementing the 2005 
agreement. 
 After demonstrating that, as conceived by member states, the responsibility of 
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states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity constituted a reaffirmation of existing legal obligations, and that the 
various ways of implementing the framework that could be identified in the 2005 
agreement were concordant with the principles and procedures set up in the United 
Nations Charter, the 2009 report went ahead and analyzed in detail the Responsibility to 
Protect as conceived by member states.  
 Crucial "in terms of the principle's conceptual development, [were] the idea[s] 
that the [Responsibility to Protect] comprises three pillars"177 - state responsibility, 
international assistance and timely response - and that Responsibility to Protect principles 
were not aimed at destroying sovereignty as an institution, but at reinforcing its content. 
Such an understanding, concordant with the re-conceptualization of 'sovereignty as 
individual and shared responsibility' developed by Deng during the mid-nineties, not only 
explains why the emerging framework defines the responsibility of states to protect their 
populations from mass atrocity crimes and their incitement, as the 'bedrock' of the 
Responsibility to Protect, but also why the framework "focuses on helping states succeed 
(pillar two), [and] not just on reacting when states fail (pillar three)."178 Once these points 
were made, the 2009 report continued by identifying different avenues that could 
facilitate the implementation of the framework, both in the short and the long term. 
 Analyzing the first pillar of the Responsibility to Protect - or the primary 
responsibility of states to protect their populations from mass atrocities and their 
incitement, as proclaimed in paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document179- 
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the 2009 report of the Secretary General explains that although states could approach the 
task of protecting populations in diverse manners, existent research pointed to the 
promotion and protection of basic rights, and the existence of mechanisms to facilitate the 
management of diversity, as crucial factors to facilitate effective protection of 
populations.  
 Accordingly, in addition to calling for needed research and analysis on pressing 
issues, such as "why one society plunges into mass violence while its neighbors remain 
relatively stable, and on why it has been so difficult to stem widespread and systematic 
sexual violence in some places[,]"180 the 2009 Report recommends to member states to 
consider various initiatives that could facilitate the development of a culture of 
prevention at the level of individual states. Among others: 
 
• The UN Human Rights Council could be used to encourage states to meet their [Responsibility to 
Protect] obligations and the Council's Universal Peer Review (UPR) mechanism could be utilized 
to monitor their performance. 
• States should become parties to the relevant instruments of human rights law, as well as to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). They should also incorporate this law into 
domestic jurisdiction  and implement it faithfully.  
• In addition to acceding to the Rome Statute, states should also do more to assist the ICC and other 
international tribunals by, for example, locating and apprehending indictees.  
• [Responsibility to Protect] principles should be localized into each culture and society so that they 
are owned and acted upon by communities and not seen as external impositions. 
• States, even stable ones, should ensure that they have mechanisms in place to deal with bigotry, 
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intolerance, racism and exclusion. 181  
 
 Analyzing the second pillar of the Responsibility to Protect, the 2009 report of the 
Secretary General argues that as proclaimed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World 
Summit Outcome Document182 "the commitment of the international community to assist 
states in meeting [their] obligations"183 could be exercised in four distinct manners: by 
encouraging states to meet their responsibilities; by helping states in exercising their 
responsibilities; by helping states in building needed protection capacities; and by 
assisting states "under stress before the conflicts break out."184  
 After explaining that a pre-condition for exercising pillar two measures is "the 
consent and cooperation of the host state,"185 and reminding member states that in cases 
where national authorities are determined to commit or facilitate the commission of mass 
atrocities, there is little that pillar two measures can accomplish, the 2009 report 
recommends specific measures on each of the second pillar's facets: 
 
• Encouraging states to meet their pillar one responsibilities: 
 - Those inciting or planning to commit the four crimes need to be made aware that they will be 
held to account.  
 - Incentives should be offered to encourage parties towards reconciliation. 
• Helping them to exercise this responsibility: 
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 - Security sector reform aimed at building and sustaining legitimate and effective security forces 
makes an important contribution to maintaining stability and provides states with the capacity to 
respond quickly and legitimately to emerging problems. 
• Helping them to build their capacity to protect: 
 - Targeted economic development assistance would assist in preventing the four crimes by 
reducing inequalities, improving education, giving the poor a stronger voice, and increasing political 
participation.  
 - International assistance should help states and societies to build the specific capacities they need 
[to] prevent genocide and mass atrocities.  
• Assisting states 'under stress before crises and conflicts break out: 
 - The UN and regional and subregional organizations could build rapidly deployable civilian and 
police capacities to help countries under stress. 
 - Where the four crimes are committed by non-state actors, international military assistance to the 
state may be the most effective form of assistance.186 
  
 Analyzing the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect - or the responsibility of 
the international community to respond in a timely and decisive manner when states are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations - the 2009 report of the Secretary General 
explains that in terms of strategy, as stated in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome 
Document, "pillar three comprises two steps. [First,] the international community, 
through the United Nations[,] has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance of Chapter VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help protect populations"187 from mass atrocity crimes. Second, and so long as 
peaceful means prove inadequate, and "national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations[, the international community has the responsibility to take 
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collective] action, through the Security Council, including enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII of the Charter."188  
 Stressing the fact that military operations for protection purposes constitute only 
one of the measures that could be authorized by Council members, the 2009 report points 
to several ways in which the international community could exercise the last pillar of the 
Responsibility to Protect: 
  
• The Security Council might use targeted sanctions on travel, financial transfers, and luxury goods, 
and arms embargos. In such cases, it is incumbent on the Security Council, relevant regional 
organizations and individual states to develop the expertise, capacity and political will necessary 
to properly implement these regimes. 
• The permanent members of the Security Council should refrain from using their veto in situations 
of manifest failure and should act in good faith to reach a consensus on exercising the Council's 
responsibility in such cases. 
• Member states may want to consider developing principles, rules and doctrine to guide the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes. 
• The UN should strengthen its capacities for the rapid deployment of military personnel, including 
by developing doctrine and training and resolving command and control issues. 
• The UN should strengthen its partnerships with regional organizations to facilitate rapid 
cooperation.189 
 
 Lastly, the report also reminded member states of the fact that "the 2005 
agreement contained a specific commitment to strengthen UN's capacity for early 
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warning"190 and reiterated Ban's "call for the establishment of a Joint Office for the 
Prevention of Genocide and [the Responsibility to Protect].191  
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11. A Productive Debate 
 
 The first formal consideration of the Responsibility to Protect at the General 
Assembly level began on July 21, 2009, when Secretary General Ban Ki-moon presented 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect to the wide membership of the United 
Nations. Although the move was criticized by some Responsibility to Protect supporters 
who feared "that a General Assembly debate could 'provide the opportunity for skeptical 
governments to renegotiate' [the 2005 Agreement,]"192 Ban's team remained cautious yet 
optimistic, since careful analysis of countries' positions showed, that "governments in the 
Asia-Pacific region, long thought the region most resistant to [the Responsibility to 
Protect], were quite open to the principle and endorsed the Secretary-General's 
approach[.]"193 
 Tensions raised when Miguel d'Escoto, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United 
Nations and then President of the General Assembly, did his best to influence his peers 
against Ban's proposed framework for better understanding and implementing the 2005 
agreement. Not only did he withhold the Responsibility to Protect as much as he could 
from the General Assembly's agenda, he was uncooperative with the Secretariat on 
establishing a date for the debate that would be compatible with Ban's schedule, but he 
also arranged for "an 'Interactive Informal Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect' on 
the morning of [July 23,] immediately prior to the GA debate."194 For the event, d' Escoto 
invited four panelists, two of them outright critics of the Responsibility to Protect, and 
distributed a 'concept note' which argued against the framework and posited that 
'colonialism and interventionism used responsibility to protect arguments'. Lastly, 
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d'Escoto appointed Nerupem Sen, former Indian Ambassador to the United Nations and a 
manifest detractor of the framework, "as his special adviser on [the Responsibility to 
Protect]."195 
 Fortunately, the "efforts [of the President of the General Assembly] failed and the 
2009 General Assembly debate vindicated [Ban and his advisers'] cautious,"196 but 
optimistic stance, since 90 of the 94 speakers who took the floor on the occasion - 
representing as many as 180 countries and two observer missions - welcomed the 
Responsibility to Protect as interpreted by the 2009 report. This was an impressive 
accomplishment considering that only four countries - Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and 
Sudan - expressed their support for a revision of the 2005 agreement.  
 Perhaps one of the most significant part of the debate was the identification by 
member states of "key measures that [could] be taken to prevent mass atrocity crimes."197  
In effect. based on the premise that state responsibility constitutes the 'bedrock' of the 
Responsibility to Protect, countries such as Austria, Colombia and Japan "stressed the 
importance of good governance, the rule of law [...] and a functioning law-enforcement 
and justice system," as well as the necessity of states becoming parties to relevant human 
rights and humanitarian conventions and treaties, including the Rome Statute. In turn, 
South Korea stressed the crucial value of conflict management mechanisms at the 
domestic level, and the importance of promoting national dialogue as well as periodic 
country risk assessments. "The Holy See argued for national policies that fostered greater 
protection of religious, racial and ethnic minorities." Countries such as Bolivia and 
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Azerbaijan, also stressed the importance of measures aimed to end impunity, such as 
prosecution for those responsible for mass atrocity crimes.   
 Commenting on the need for strengthening early warning capacities, the United 
States and Azerbaijan underscored the importance of further analysis on the factors that 
can lead to the commission of mass atrocities. Complementing the position, Armenia, 
Chile and Israel stressed the need for governments themselves, as well as for the 
international community, to pay attention to warning signs. In turn, the United States 
pointed to the need for "'effective UN human rights machinery, including 'more credible 
action from the Human Rights Council and timely information on unfolding and potential 
calamities from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the network 
for Independent UN Rapporteurs and Experts'."198 Countries such as Armenia, Canada, 
Chile, Croatia, Leichtenstein, Slovenia and South Korea also stressed the crucial role to 
be played by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. Some of these countries 
also underscored the need for strengthening the position of the Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect.  
 Many states199 also stressed the importance of improving existing mediation 
capacities and called for a bigger allocation of resources to the area. The European Union 
underscored the relevance of developing mediation capacities at the local level. 
Illustrating the utility of these types of measures, Timor-Leste shared its experience as a 
recipient of "valuable assistance [...] in building local mediation and conflict resolution 
capacities."200 For its part, the United States called for the need of further strengthening 
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United Nations mediation standby teams, and publicly recognized their invaluable 
contributions.  
 Approximately 60 states underscored the importance of regional organizations in 
supporting the emerging framework. Countries such as Sierra Leone, South Africa and 
Ghana called for greater cooperation and support from the United Nations with African 
organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). In turn, Sierra Leone pointed to institutional and operational 
advances such as "Africa's Continental and Early Warning Systems, the AU Panel of the 
Wise, and the building of a 15-20,000 strong African Standby Force (ASF) as the most 
effective ways of enhancing the continent's capacity to address African problems at the 
sub-regional level."201 The European Union also underscored the importance of regional 
organizations' various instruments to assist states in building capacities "in areas of 
conflict prevention, development and human rights, good governance, rule of law and 
judicial and security sector reform."202 The Philippines called for greater support from the 
United Nations in helping build civilian capacities at the regional and sub-regional level 
and pointed to "the potential value of region-to-region learning processes and their 
adaptation to local conditions and cultures."203 Lastly, South Korea stressed the urgency 
of incorporating Responsibility to Protect related criteria into peer review mechanisms at 
the regional level.  
 Countries such as Uruguay, Luxembourg and the Solomon Islands also 
highlighted the possibility of a stronger role to be played by the Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC). In turn, "Nigeria noted the role of the African Union Framework for 
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Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development as a complement of the PBC."204 Lastly, 
Jordan argued that the General Assembly should contribute in strengthening the 
Responsibility to Protect by focusing not only on the potential role to be played by the 
PBC, but also by the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council.   
 In the end, although the debate clearly identified that there are still areas of 
concern for some states, such as the issue of selectivity and double standards, the need for 
a more representative and effective Security Council, and the potential for the 
Responsibility to Protect to be abused by powerful states, it also revealed a deepening 
consensus or common understanding on six points:   
 
 First, the [Responsibility to Protect] is a universal principle [to be applied at all times and all 
places.] Second, the [Responsibility to Protect] lies first and foremost with the state[.] Third, the 
[Responsibility to Protect] applies only to the four crimes and their prevention. Fourth, the [Responsibility 
to Protect] must be implemented and exercised in a manner consistent with international law and the UN 
Charter[.] Fifth, measures related to the [Responsibility to Protect] third pillar include more than simply 
coercion or the use of force[.] Finally, prevention is the most important element of the [Responsibility to 
Protect].205 
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12. Contributions, Pending Challenges and Limitations of the Responsibility to 
Protect 
 In "The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On," Bellamy provides us with an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the Responsibility to Protect during the 2005-2010 
period. After analyzing a series of cases "in which he believes [that the Responsibility to 
Protect] was either used too little (Somalia), used ineffectively (Darfur) or employed 
effectively (Kenya),"206 and accepting that it is perhaps to early to tell, Bellamy 
demonstrates that, to-date, the ability of the framework to provide effective results on the 
ground is at best mixed. In the article, Bellamy also elaborates on various issues which 
seem specially relevant for my argument in this section, since they refer to the 
relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and greater compliance with 
international law. 
 In building his argument, Bellamy tells us that the Responsibility to Protect "is 
commonly conceptualized as fulfilling two functions, but that the two are not 
complementary."207 The author argues that one cannot sustain that the Responsibility to 
Protect represents at the same time a "political commitment to prevent and halt genocide 
and mass atrocities accompanied by a policy agenda in need of implementation,"208 209 
and "a speech act and catalyst for action,"210 211 because the Responsibility to Protect 
represents a universal principle, applicable at all times, and in all places, and not "a label 
that can be attached to particular crises."212 
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 Bellamy also tells us that although there seems to be consensus in conceptualizing 
the Responsibility to Protect as a norm,213 there is less clarity "on what sort of norm it 
is."214 According to the author, although it is clear that the Responsibility to Protect's first 
pillar215 is to be understood as a reaffirmation of existing legal obligations, the normative 
status of pillars two and three216 are somehow questionable, since these dimensions "are 
weakened by the problem of indeterminacy."217  
 Bellamy then reminds us of the varied but ineffective and weak responses of the 
international community to humanitarian crises which occurred between 2005 and 2010 
in countries like Sudan and Somalia, and advances the argument that while during the 
2005 World Summit states may have agreed that something is to be done in this type of 
cases, the fact that the international community has a "relatively free hand to what [is to 
be done,] severely restricts [the Responsibility to Protect's] compliance-pull, and hence 
its ability to encourage states to find consensus and commit additional resources to the 
protection of civilians."218 Explaining the situation, Bellamy affirms that "the more 
precise a norm indicates the behavior it expects in a given situation, the stronger its 
compliance pull." 
 Finally, commenting on the contributions of the framework, Bellamy goes back to 
the first 'function' of the Responsibility to Protect. After reminding us that "[t]he further 
upstream we go in terms of structural prevention, the more difficult it is to demonstrate 
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[the Responsibility to Protect's] impact[,]"219 and of pointing to cases220 where "a 
combination of international observation and engagement"221 seemed to have a positive 
effect on the behavior of relevant actors, since mass atrocities did not follow from 
national confrontations, Bellamy concludes: 
 
 Given that indeterminacy makes it unlikely that [the Responsibility to Protect] will act in the near 
future as a catalyst for international action in response to genocide and mass atrocities, it seems reasonable 
to argue that the most prudent path is to view the principle as a policy agenda in need of implementation 
rather than as a 'red flag' to galvanize the world into action. This view would certainly be consistent with 
the evidence thus far that [the Responsibility to Protect] is best employed as a diplomatic tool, or prism, to 
guide efforts to stem the tide of mass atrocities, and that it has little utility in terms of generating additional 
international political will in response to such episodes.222   
  
 Yet, Bellamy's line of reasoning seems problematic not only because "on an 
operational plane [the two functions of the Responsibility to Protect]223 need not to be 
incompatible, if pursued in reasonable proportions and if it is understood that a call to 
action does not necessarily refer to military and coercive action,"224 but because it also 
ignores cases such as Kenya, where structural prevention failed,225 yet where 
international action through mediation, was successful in reversing the situation. 
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 Furthermore, because Bellamy bases his line of reasoning on an erroneous 
understanding not only of what is the Responsibility to Protect but also of the way 
international law functions, his whole analysis concerning what should be expected from 
the developing framework seems flawed. In effect, as it has been stressed by the current 
Secretary General and his advisers, the Responsibility to Protect "does not seek to add 
new norms or standards"226 to the ones contained in existing international agreements,227 
but instead, to provide individual states and the international community with a 
comprehensive strategy able to integrate a "coherent set of ideas for implementing" 
foundational norms and related principles228 of the Responsibility to Protect within the 
terms of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.  
 Moreover, in understanding the commitment of the international community to 
assist and support states in fulfilling their obligations, and under certain circumstances to 
act collectively, it is basic to keep in mind two facts that are crucial in terms of what 
should be expected from the Responsibility to Protect. First, that as agreed by member 
states, timely and decisive action is to be decided by the Secretary General, if measures 
are pacific, or through processes at the regional and global levels that take place on 
political bodies such as the African Union Peace and Security Council229 and the United 
Nations Security Council "where there is no automaticity or rigid template demanding a 
particular course of action."230 Second, that international assistance and response "cannot 
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require a successful outcome [since] there is no certain way of knowing beforehand 
which course of action will make the most positive difference."231 
 Furthermore, concerning the compliance-pull that the framework can generate 
when utilized as a speech act, it is clear that the issue is not if "the invocation of [the 
Responsibility to Protect] exerts no pull"232 233 but if this is sufficient. This point brings 
us back to what should be expected from international law, since "[i]f we expect norms, 
standards and principles to be respected and implemented all the time[,] then we would 
not have any." In addition, as correctly posited by Luck, "compliance tends to deepen 
over time [as standards of behavior which are characterized by] important aspirational 
qualities, [are] emulated and attained over time."234   
 So, if the Responsibility to Protect is not a norm, what is it, and what are its 
contributions, pending challenges and limitations? Considering its non-binding nature, 
and the fact that the Responsibility to Protect "represents a shared understanding or 
consensus about procedure among"235 member states - in the sense that there is 
"[a]greement that something ought to be done when an important international standard 
has been breached in unacceptable ways"236 - it seems fair to conceptualize the 
framework as a soft law mechanism aimed at facilitating compliance with previously 
agreed-to standards of behavior. In other words, what the Responsibility to Protect 
"brings to existing norms on genocide prevention, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity, in fact, is the nucleus of a multilateral compliance 
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mechanism."237 Seen in this light, it is easier to understand why it is that the main 
contribution of the framework is not really legal, but political, since what the 2005 
agreement actually does is add "a universal and high-level political dimension that the 
struggle against genocide has sorely lacked over the past six decades."238  
 
 [Yet it is basic to keep in mind that the] status quo gives way slowly, sometimes painfully slowly, 
at the United Nations. But it does give way with time and sustained effort[.] No doubt the first two pillars - 
the preventive or upstream end of [the Responsibility to Protect] will become standard operating procedure 
for the UN system and its partners well before the third pillar. The first two pillars, with their stress on 
prevention, capacity-building and rebuilding, early warning and global regional collaboration, face little 
political opposition. Here the challenge is more institutional and intellectual - figuring out what needs to be 
done, how to do it, and who should do it - than political. The implementation of the third pillar, mounting a 
'timely and decisive' response when a state is 'manifestly failing to protect its population, will come more 
slowly and unevenly.239  
  
 This last point takes us to the limitations not only of the Responsibility to Protect 
but of international law in general. In this point it is useful to go back to Diehl et al. who 
explain that: 
 
 The tenuous relationship between international law and international politics has created a barrier 
to understanding the conditions that make international law effective. As a factor in ordering international 
relations, international law manages the challenges of global governance generated by power, politics, and 
natural phenomena through system-wide change and adaptation. To perform effectively, international law 
requires that three elements be in alignment: 
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• the existence of a legal concept that is sufficiently developed to be communicated clearly; 
• the availability of a structure or framework that can support the operation of the law; 
• the political consensus and will of the system's members to use the law.240 
 
 In effect, not only is the Responsibility to Protect part of a bigger process, but 
"ultimately[,] it is all about political will,"241 and this is not only from the perspective of 
government authorities who are supposed to protect their populations from mass 
atrocities and their incitement, but from neighbors, sub-regional and regional 
organizations, as well as from relevant bodies of the United Nations. Yet it is important 
to keep in mind that the framework is still developing and, as it was stated earlier, that its 
most important contribution is its political dimension. In other words, although the 
possibility of breaking the law, or the P5 using their veto power is a reality, they may 
become "an increasingly unattractive recourse"242 as the legitimacy of the framework, 
derived both from increasing global consensus, and from the gradual operationalisation of 
its related principles and components, are "likely to raise political costs"243 of violations, 
and of blocking timely and decisive action, when states manifestly fail to protect their 
populations.   
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